Trust

Evaluation & coverage

Run the POC scorecard, then use the matrix for vector-by-vector honesty.

POC scorecard

POC scorecard

~30–40 min with baseline applied. Check each row before production claims.

#ActionPass criteria
1Install TURI + approve ES/NE extensionsmacfirewall_security_events.jsonl receives AUTH events within 5 min
2Apply /docs/secure-baseline policy fragmentjq shows enforce + supply_chain_install_gate_enabled: true
3Run Lab 1 — npm postinstall chain (mf test-intercept)→ lab on scenariosgrep shows transitive_package_execution; baseline adds block/intercept
4Run Lab 2 — secret read → egress simulation→ lab on scenariosfileOpen + behavioral chain; baseline shows fileOpenBlocked or NE drop
5Run Lab 3 — ungoverned runner from IDE→ lab on scenariosexecBlocked on raw node under enforce; mf wrap path allows with lineage
6Run Lab 4 — MCP tool reads secrets then phones home→ lab on scenariosBehavioral alert on read→connect chain; baseline shows fileOpenBlocked or NE drop + quarantine
7Run Lab 5 — prompt injection triggers local file modification→ lab on scenariosexecBlocked or fileWriteBlocked under enforce; agent_self_modification rule fire in monitor
8Review /docs/evaluation matrix for remaining gapsPOC owner signs off on supply-chain async vs sync limits

Runtime firewall vs attack vectors

partial

Supply chain (postinstall RAT)

Claim: Critical / High — block package manager → system scripting

TodayAlerts on suspicious postinstall chains; sync gate available but off by default
HardenedSync gate on + promoted block rules + propagated install contracts
strong

Credential & identity theft

Claim: High — file access governance

TodayFile access governance on AI-initiated processes; sensitive path enforcement
HardenedEnforce mode + workspace allowlist policy
partial

Data exfiltration

Claim: High — read mapped to egress

TodayCausal graph links credential access to network egress; behavioral network gating
HardenedDefault-deny egress + lower behavioral threshold
partial

Infrastructure / local SSRF

Claim: Moderate — loopback isolation

TodayBlocks private/loopback egress during install; MCP metadata service protection
HardenedExpanded intent-based egress rules beyond install context
N/A

Vulnerable code generation

Claim: Low — execution guard only

TodayNo runtime signal for insecure generated source code
Hardenedn/a — use SAST upstream

Known gaps (default policy)

  • transitive_package_execution and polyglot_execution_pivot are alert-only by default.
  • Vanilla npm install does not mint semantic install contracts without mf wrap / capability tokens.
  • Supply-chain install gate defaults to off.
  • Behavioral ingest is async — not always preemptive AUTH deny.
  • LiteLLM-style exec(base64…) vs base64 -d | — see ungoverned runner scenario.
  • K8s / in-cluster preemptive kill — out of scope; see non-coverage note.

How to harden

Secure baseline + scenario labs. Design partner tuning for false positives: Partners.